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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
This permissive appeal presents constitutional issues of first impression in Idaho; namely,

whether truthful publications on matters of public concern may nonetheless be actionable and, if
so, under what circumstances, and whether a public school teacher and coach should be deemed
a public official for purposes of constitutional scrutiny on matters of public concern.
Respondent James Verity (“Mr. Verity”) lost his teaching license in Oregon after the
middle school teacher and high school coach admitted to an “inappropriate physical relationship
involving sexual contact” with an 18-year-old high school student athlete. When reinstatement
of his license proved unsuccessful in Oregon, Mr. Verity moved to Idaho where he obtained both
a teaching certificate and job as a high school teacher and girls’ basketball coach. Appellants
KGW and KTVB broadcast stories that truthfully described Mr. Verity’s Oregon license
revocation and subsequent employment in Idaho. Such stories were local stories related to a
Pulitzer Prize nominated report by Appellants USA Today and Stephen Reilly into the issue of
disparate teacher discipline tracking systems at the state and local level and, more specifically,
teachers guilty of serious misconduct finding their way back into the classroom. Mr. Verity
voluntarily resigned his positions in Idaho after his history of misconduct in Oregon became
widely known. Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Verity sued Appellants for defamation, invasion of
privacy, and infliction of emotional distress. 1
Mr. Verity admits the truth of every material statement that the Appellants published, but
1

Mrs. Verity’s claims were dismissed by the trial court and are not the subject of this appeal.
R. 1536-1540.

1

asserts that false implications in each of the publications constitute defamation, invasion of
privacy, and emotional distress. Appellants moved for summary judgment on all claims since
the publications are true and/or substantially true, privileged, and because Mr. Verity was unable
to demonstrate actual malice by each of the Appellants. The district court refused to dismiss
Mr. Verity’s claims, reframing his defamation claim as one for “defamation by implication” and
finding that despite the truth of each statement, a jury could infer falsehoods and intent by each
Appellant sufficient to sustain such claim and the related claims of false light invasion of privacy
and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Given the significant constitutional
issues involved, Appellants immediately moved for permissive appeal of the district court’s
decision by this Court.
B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Mr. Verity’s Teaching/Coaching History in Oregon, Inappropriate
Relationship with Student-Athlete, and License Revocation.

The Teacher Standards and Practices Commission (“TSPC”) licensed Mr. Verity to teach
in Oregon (R. 245; 1377 at 26:11-13), and during the 2004-2005 school year, he taught and
coached at the middle school in Prineville, Oregon and was the head varsity girls’ basketball and
softball coach at the high school. R. 247-250; 1377 at 27:9-29:23. Mr. Verity first met Rachael
Conley in 2001 when she was a freshman on his junior varsity basketball team at Crook County
High School. R. 1379 at 34:22-35:6. Mr. Verity continued to coach Rachael when she played
on the school’s varsity basketball team her junior and senior years. R. 1379 at 35:12-24. During
her senior year (2004-2005), Rachael was also a Juvenile Tutor assigned to Mr. Verity’s middle
school science class for which she received academic credit. R. 254; 1379 at 36:9-38:16. During

2

this same time, Rachael lived at her friend’s house during the week. R. 254; 262.
Beginning in the spring of 2005, Mr. Verity began having “an inappropriate physical
relationship involving sexual contact (defined in OAR 584-20-005(a)(b)(c))” with Rachael.
R. 254-257. See also R. 296 at ¶ 6. From February 28, 2005 to May 25, 2005, investigators
found:
[a]pproximately 2,625 text messages between Mr. Verity and Rachel Conley [sic]
. . . many of these messages took place from 10:00 pm to 6:00 am in the morning
– often lasting hours on end. Others took place during Mr. Verity’s work hours
while on duty at Crook County Middle School.
R. 252. These text messages – many sexual in nature – began in November 2004. R. 296 at ¶ 4;
1381 at 42:14-43:1. Investigators also found “[a]pproximately 507 hours of phone conversations
between Mr. Verity and Rachael Conley which took place between November 22, 2004 and
May 25, 2005.” R. 252. Finally, investigators found that “Mr. Verity engaged in inappropriate
physical conduct” with Rachael, which included “kissing on the lips, neck and earlobe, grinding
his pelvis in her pelvic area and touching her breasts and groin area.” R. 296 at ¶ 6. Mr. Verity
admits to at least two separate incidents where he had inappropriate physical contact with
Rachael. R. 1381-1382 at 43:2-16; 43:17-46:1.
On June 9, 2005, Crook County relieved Mr. Verity of his coaching duties. R. 280; 1390
at 79:20-80:14. On July 11, 2005, Mr. Verity agreed to resign “from his employment in lieu of
termination” in exchange, inter alia, for the District agreeing to provide him with a reference for
future employment “without mention of this agreement or the events giving rise thereto.” R. 284
at ¶¶ 3, 6; 1391 at 82:25-83:13. Mr. Verity was concerned about giving prospective employers

3

information about his “ethical violation” because of its potential negative impact on his ability to
get new employment. R. 1391 at 85:12-20. Mr. Verity resigned on July 11, 2005, and the school
district provided him with a letter of reference for future employers that did not include any
details of Mr. Verity’s inappropriate relationship with Rachael. R. 287.
From August 2005 through April 2006, TSPC conducted an investigation into
Mr. Verity’s actions, the result of which was a Stipulation of Facts, Order of Revocation and
Probation dated August 4, 2006. R. 295-298. Under this Stipulation and Order, the TSPC
revoked Mr. Verity’s Oregon teaching license for one (1) year from the date of the Order (e.g.,
August 4, 2006) and held that if his license was reinstated, a four (4) year probation would be
imposed upon Mr. Verity subject to special terms and conditions. R. 297.
2.

Mr. Verity Fails to Reinstate his Oregon Teaching License.

Beginning on July 11, 2007, Mr. Verity reapplied for his Oregon teaching license.
R. 303-310; 1396 at 104:16-105:2; 312-316; 1397 at 109:4-13. The TSPC required Mr. Verity to
complete several conditions, including a complete psychological evaluation. See R. 295-298.
To that end, Mr. Verity was seen and evaluated by James R. Hamer, MS, and Michelle
Whitehead, Ph.D. R. 1398-1400 at 111:2-121:9.
Dr. Whitehead submitted a comprehensive evaluation of Mr. Verity to the TSPC.
R. 329-333.

Her report included seven conclusions and recommendations (R. 332-333),

including “Mr. Verity should not coach female high school students” and “If Mr. Verity returns
to teaching he should not be alone with any female student over the age of 12.” R. 332-333. On
June 11, 2008, the TSPC denied Mr. Verity’s application for reinstatement because he “failed to
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establish fitness to serve as an educator.” R. 344-347. Mr. Verity appealed this decision. R. 349;
1403 at 130:14-25.
3.

Mr. Verity Applies for Idaho Teaching License.

While his reinstatement proceedings were pending in Oregon, Mr. Verity submitted an
application for an Idaho teaching license (R. 335-337; 1400-1401 at 121:23-122:14) wherein he
reported that TSPC officials “decided to reinstate my license based on another letter of
stipulation.” R. 335. Later Mr. Verity submitted materials in support of his application to Idaho
officials. R. 351-362. Mr. Verity’s application materials do not disclose the facts underlying his
resignation from Crook County or his license revocation. R. 335-337; 351-362; 1401 at 122:15123:3; 1402 at 126:15-25; 1403-1404 at 133:20-134:11. Mr. Verity’s teaching license has never
been reinstated in Oregon. R. 1401 at 125:14-22.
Idaho officials denied Mr. Verity’s application for a teaching certificate based on “your
conduct in Oregon.” R. 364. Mr. Verity appealed this denial and retained his brother-in-law,
Mr. Shepherd, to assist him in the appeal. R. 366-367.
4.

Mr. Verity Pursues Appeals in Idaho and Oregon.

On September 30, 2008, the Idaho Professional Standards Commission of the Department
of Education of the State of Idaho (“Idaho PSC”) denied Mr. Verity’s application, but held “the
record” open until April 1, 2009 to allow Mr. Verity to supplement his submissions. R. 75 at
¶ 34; 369-374. Thereafter, Mr. Verity provided additional materials. R. 1406 at 144:14-145:3.
Mr. Verity’s application for reinstatement in Oregon was denied on February 23, 2009.
R. 378. In so doing, the TSPC relied upon Dr. Whitehead’s “reservations about Mr. Verity’s
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trustworthiness to teach female students” and her opinion that “Mr. Verity should not coach high
school aged girls or be left alone with female students over 12” to conclude that “these
restrictions disqualify Mr. Verity from being fit and trustworthy to hold a license.” R. 377. “The
Commission also finds that Mr. Verity has not fully acknowledged the extent of his misconduct.”
R. 377.
A month later, Mr. Verity’s counsel submitted supplemental materials to Idaho’s Chief
Certification Officer, Christina Linder. R. 381-400. Based on these materials, the Idaho PSC
entered an order directing Ms. Linder “to grant Mr. Verity’s Application for an Idaho teaching
credential.” R. 405.
5.

Veritys Move to Idaho and Obtain Idaho Teaching License Over Objection
of Idaho’s Chief Certification Officer.

The Verity family moved to Idaho in June 2009. R. 1400 at 121:18-22. By mid-July
2009, Ms. Linder had not issued an Idaho teaching credential to Mr. Verity, prompting
Mr. Shepherd to write a letter to the Idaho Attorney General’s Office:
it is my understanding that, despite the Panel’s order, the chief certification officer
(“CCO”) intends to issue a license to Mr. Verity with conditions. . . . that Mr.
Verity disclose with all teaching applications that he had his Oregon teaching
license revoked. The obvious intent of such a condition is to effectively render
Mr. Verity’s license useless despite the Panel’s order to issue a license. This
condition serves no purpose except to make it extremely difficult for Mr. Verity to
get a job.
R. 409-410 (emphasis added).) Accordingly, he demanded that the CCO “immediately comply
with the Panel’s order” or he threatened to file a lawsuit to compel such action. R. 410.
Ms. Linder and counsel reviewed Mr. Shepherd’s demand, and Ms. Linder capitulated, writing:
“Counsel & I have reviewed – will issue certificate against my will.” R. 407 (emphasis added).

6

Idaho issued Mr. Verity a teaching certificate in July 2009. R. 75 at ¶ 36.
6.

Mr. Verity’s Teaching Positions in Idaho.

After obtaining his Idaho teaching certificate, Mr. Verity applied for several teaching
positions in Ada and Canyon County, Idaho. R. 75 at ¶ 37. Although Mr. Verity disclosed the
circumstances surrounding his license revocation in Oregon to Idaho state licensing officials, he
did not provide the same information in his application materials to local schools. See, e.g.,
R. 413; 1412 at 166:21-167:11 (Verity application to Caldwell School District states that he was
a teacher in Oregon who “resigned from teaching position, contractor opportunity”).
In August/September 2010, Mr. Verity began as a physical science teacher at Caldwell
High School and coached boys’ basketball. R. 75 at ¶ 38; 1412 at 166:2-20; 1412-1413 at
169:10-171:7. On February 22, 2013, Caldwell placed Mr. Verity on administrative leave after
reports that he had “made inappropriate contact with female students in [his] classroom. These
allegations include tickling, slapping girls on the butt, and comments made about
punching/hitting when students need to go to the restroom.” R. 417. An investigation was
conducted during which “[a] number of students verified that [Mr. Verity] hit students on the
behind, back of the legs, arms and/or head with a ruler during class time.” R. 419-420.
After concluding its investigation, on February 27, 2013, Caldwell High School issued a
formal letter of reprimand to Mr. Verity, stating:
Your actions regarding hitting of students during the 2012-2013 school year, have
been unprofessional and detrimental to the well being of the students you have hit,
as well as the other students in the classroom. . . . As a result, this letter of
reprimand is warranted. In the future, you are expected to not, under any
circumstance, touch or have any physical contact with any student at any time that
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may reasonably be interpreted as threatening or endangering the student’s
welfare.
R. 419.
On June 12, 2014, Mr. Verity submitted an application to the Vallivue School District for
a sixth grade science teaching position at Sage Valley Middle School. R. 435-438; 1419 at
197:7-13. In the application, Mr. Verity described his departure from the Crook County School
District as “resigned position. Obtained contracting license and opening contracting business.”
R. 436. In response to a question of whether he had “any disciplinary action taken against you
for misconduct?” Mr. Verity replied “No.” R. 437. On July 15, 2014, Caldwell accepted
Mr. Verity’s resignation (R. 442), and he began work at Sage Valley Middle School in the
Vallivue School District. R. 1422 at 206:5-207:5.
In November 2014, Mr. Verity applied to coach basketball at Eagle High School and
started coaching the freshman-sophomore team. R. 444-451; 1422 at 207:7-208:22. Nothing in
Mr. Verity’s application to coach basketball at Eagle High School disclosed the reasons for his
resignation from Crook County Middle School and the revocation of his Oregon teaching
license, nor did Mr. Verity disclose these facts to anyone at Eagle High School. R. 444-451;
1422 at 208:23-209:18.
7.

Mr. Reilly and USA Today Begin Yearlong, National Investigation Into
Tracking Teacher Discipline at State and Local Level.

USA Today is a newspaper of nationwide circulation (R. 629; 659), and Mr. Reilly is an
Investigative Reporter and Data Specialist with USA Today. R. 204 at 12:6-9; 205 at 13:11-18.
In late 2014, Mr. Reilly and his editor “noticed news coverage of teacher misconduct and wanted
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to do a national analysis of teacher misconduct to identify any issues in the systems that are
meant to protect students from teacher misconduct.” R. 206 at 17:18-19:12. To that end, in
January 2015, Mr. Reilly “began sending a series of records requests to education agencies in
each state to obtain databases and other records pertaining to teachers who have been disciplined
and teachers who are licensed.” R. 206 at 19:22-20:1. This was a “very long and sometimes
complicated process” (R. 206 at 20:10-16) and involved Mr. Reilly “analyz[ing] teacher
misconduct data from every state from which [he] had received it and compar[ing] it to names of
teachers who may be currently teaching in other states.” R. 209 at 29:11-14.
Once much of Mr. Reilly’s database work had been collected and analyzed, USA Today
“distributed [its] data to journalists in every state in which [it had] a partner organization.”
R. 207 at 23:5-10; see also R. 207 at 23:19-21 (“USA Today worked with reporters at [Gannett]
newspapers and TEGNA news stations as part of this project.”). KGW, a Portland based
television station, and KTVB, a Boise based television station, are part of the TEGNA group of
news stations and were invited to use the materials gathered by USA Today to do their own
reporting on a local level. R. 118 at ¶ 2; 207 at 22:8-23:25; 208 at 28:7-9; 211 at 49:6-25;
619-620. “Mr. Verity’s name was one of the names of teachers included in the data.” R. 209 at
29:21-22.
After reviewing the publically available information about Mr. Verity, Mr. Reilly
“conducted an investigation of [Mr. Verity’s] teaching in Idaho, including contacting school
administrators in that state in systems in which he was working or had worked.” R. 210 at
34:3-8. Mr. Reilly recorded each of his phone calls as well as his interview with Mr. Verity.
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R. 210 at 36:2-20; see also Supp. R. at DKK Dec. Exs. 77-84. In one such call, Caldwell School
District Superintendent Jodi Mills informed Mr. Reilly, after reviewing district records, that her
district was unaware of Mr. Reilly’s license revocation and underlying behavior in Oregon at the
time it hired him and, had the district known those facts, it would “absolutely” have been a
concern. R. 215 at 67:7-18; 216 at 71:22-72:2; Supp. R. at DKK Dec. Ex. 80.
On February 8, 2016, Mr. Reilly emailed Mr. Verity to let him know about his
forthcoming article and to ask to speak with him about the article because “it is important to me
[Reilly] that I hear your side of the story and incorporate your perspective into my article –
especially if you feel the descriptions in the [Oregon Teacher Discipline proceedings] are
inaccurate, incomplete or unfair in any way.” R. 455; 1423 at 210:13-211:14. Mr. Verity did not
respond to Mr. Reilly’s email. R. 1423-1424 at 213:6-215:17. Mr. Reilly continued to reach out
to Mr. Verity for comment, finally reaching him on his classroom telephone on February 10,
2016, which Mr. Reilly recorded. R. 457-458; 1424 at 215:21-216:8; Supp. R. at DKK Dec. Exs.
79-84. Mr. Reilly memorialized this brief phone interview in writing, which he later emailed to
KGW and KTVB. Id. Mr. Verity reviewed this memorialization during his deposition and
confirmed its accuracy. R. 457-458; 562-563; 1424-1426 at 216:19-222:17; Supp. R. at DKK
Dec. Ex. 84.
8.

KGW and KTVB Begin Reporting on Story.

John Tierney is an Executive Producer at KGW in Portland and worked with Mr. Reilly
on the teacher misconduct story.

R. 118-119 at ¶¶ 1, 5, 7; 207-208 at 23:22-25:2; 670.

Mr. Tierney received, and relied upon, the data and information shared by USA Today and

10

Mr. Reilly concerning Mr. Verity. R. 188 at ¶ 4; 674-676. In addition, KGW did its own
investigative reporting into Mr. Verity. R. 188 at ¶ 6; 676; 688-689. Mr. Tierney and KGW
shared information by and with KTVB and its reporter Tami Tremblay, including
Ms. Tremblay’s contacts with school officials in Idaho in reporting its own story. R. 119 at ¶ 7;
677.
Ms. Tremblay is an investigative reporter/anchor/producer at KTVB in Boise who
worked on the teacher misconduct story beginning in about January 2016. R. 208 at 25:23-28:3;
223 at 11:8-12; 225-226 at 24:23-25:8; 226 at 28:15-23. Ms. Tremblay received materials,
including teaching discipline and licensing databases, from USA Today and Mr. Reilly regarding
a “companywide investigation” that had a working title of “The Dishonor Roll,” R. 224-225 at
18:18-21:17, and that the KGW story was going to focus on Mr. Verity. R. 119 at ¶ 8; 225 at
21:21-23:9; 474. The reporters shared copies of Mr. Verity’s discipline records from Oregon and
records related to his license to teach in Idaho. R. 119 at ¶ 8; 227 at 29:4-31:17; 476-77.
Ms. Tremblay first attempted to contact Mr. Verity by email on February 5, 2016. R. 171
at 211:18-212:6; 453. Ms. Tremblay also attempted to contact Mr. Verity through social media
to request an interview. None of these efforts was successful. R. 230-231 at 44:19-45:4; 1423 at
213:1-4. Ms. Tremblay also reached out to a number of Idaho officials, R. 227 at 31:18-25; 230
at 41:18-42:7, including Idaho Department of Education spokesperson, Jeff Church, who spoke
to Ms. Tremblay on camera about the process of teacher licensing in Idaho. R. 227-228 at
32:14-33:3; 576-579.
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On February 5, 2016, Ms. Tremblay emailed Vallivue School District Superintendent Pat
Charlton, indicating that she was working on a story with “our sister station in Portland” and
hoped that Dr. Charlton would help her gather information or provide a statement based on the
following information:
A 6th grade teacher currently at Sage Valley Middle School received disciplinary
action in Oregon for having inappropriate behavior with a student. The Oregon
Board of Education never reported the information to the national database,
NASDTEC, so Idaho had no idea when issuing him a license to teach here. He is
certainly not the only teacher, but I wanted to get the district’s take on this
information . . .
R. 573. Superintendent Charlton confirmed the accuracy of Ms. Tremblay’s information. R. 573.
See also R. 230 at 43:18-44:16. Ms. Tremblay shared this information with Mr. Tierney on the
same day.

R. 522-523. Mr. Reilly was able to get more substantive information from

Dr. Charlton on February 8, 2016, R. 230 at 43:13-44:13; 583, which he in turn shared with
Mr. Tierney and Ms. Tremblay. R. 581-585.
Superintendent Mills confirmed to Ms. Tremblay, over the course of two telephone calls,
that Mr. Verity was not on the teacher misconduct database and that the district had no
knowledge of his license revocation in Oregon. R. 228 at 33:24-35:9; 229 at 37:10-38:23.
Accordingly, Ms. Tremblay relied upon information she received from KGW and USA Today, in
addition to her own newsgathering efforts, to produce the KTVB story. R. 226 at 27:2-28:14.
On February 9, 2016, Mr. Reilly sent Mr. Tierney a draft of his article along with updated
information about Mr. Verity: “I’m checking over everything, and noticed, Verity’s name
actually was submitted to NASDTEC in 2006.” R. 119 at ¶ 11; 553. Ms. Tremblay was not
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copied on this email. R. 553.
Although early drafts of Mr. Reilly’s national story included references to Mr. Verity, he
was not included in the final USA Today story. R. 212 at 53:20-56:5. Mr. Reilly and his editor
planned to use “Mr. Verity in a followup or sidebar story.” R. 212 at 55:15-17.
9.

February 15, 2016 Stories by USA Today/Reilly and KGW.

On February 15, 2016, USA Today published its investigative story entitled “Teachers
Flee Troubled Pasts: A Fragmented State System for Checking Educators’ Backgrounds Leaves
Gaps That Put Students at Risk” by Mr. Reilly. R. 570-571. USA Today also posted a version of
this story on its website. R. 217-218 at 76:23-77:2; 593-603. Neither the print version nor the
web version of the USA Today story mentioned Mr. or Mrs. Verity. R. 218 at 77:3-6; 1427 at
226:18-227:7.
Also on February 15, 2016, KGW broadcast a story entitled “The Dishonor Roll,” which
addressed the issue of tracking teacher discipline between state and local entities and described
Mr. Verity’s license revocation in Oregon and subsequent employment in Idaho. Supp. R. at
DKK Dec. Ex. 68; R. 677-678. KGW also posted a version of the USA Today story entitled
“Broken Tracking Systems Let Teachers Flee Troubled Pasts: An investigation found
fundamental defects in the teacher screening systems used to ensure the safety of children in the
nation’s more than 13,000 school districts” (R. 120 at ¶ 13; 213-217 at 57:20-76:1; 494-502;
525-533; 677-678) which included “some of the Oregon/Idaho details” involving Mr. Verity.
R. 560. Compare R. 593-603 (USA Today) with R. 525-533 (KGW). See also R. 120 at ¶ 15.
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10.

USA Today Continues Reporting on Mr. Verity.

Mr. Reilly continued reporting on Mr. Verity after his original February 15, 2016 story
ran, including interviewing Mr. Verity’s Principal at Sage Valley Middle School, Sean Smith, by
telephone on February 23, 2016. R. 219 at 94:8-10. Principal Smith told Mr. Reilly that he did
not become aware of documents regarding the revocation of Mr. Verity’s Oregon teaching
license during the hiring process. R. 637; 1157 at 94:8-10. Mr. Reilly also reached out to
Dr. Charlton again. Supp. R. at DKK Dec. Ex. 87.
11.

Mr. Verity Voluntarily Resigns Teaching and Coaching Positions in Idaho.

On February 22, 2016, Mr. Verity signed a Separation Agreement with the Vallivue
School District. R. 460-461; 1427 at 227:17-228:21. Under the terms of this Agreement,
Mr. Verity agreed to submit his letter of resignation immediately, and the District agreed to pay
Mr. Verity “gross pay of $18,868.61” on February 25, 2016 and his benefits through April 30,
2016. R. 460. Moreover, the Agreement provided an acknowledgement by the parties that they
had “entered into this Agreement voluntarily, that they have not been coerced or threatened into
signing this Agreement.” R. 460. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Verity submitted a letter of resignation
dated February 22, 2016. R. 463; 1428 at 230:10-24. Late on February 22, 2016, Dr. Charlton
emailed Ms. Tremblay to inform her Mr. Verity’s resignation. R. 587.
12.

USA Today and KGW Report on Mr. Verity’s Resignation.

On February 24, 2016, USA Today published a story entitled “Third Teacher Forced Out
by Probe” by Mr. Reilly, which reported that Mr. Verity “resigned after journalists questioned
him and district and state officials about his career in both states [Oregon and Idaho].” R. 468;
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565. This story appeared in both USA Today’s print edition (R. 565-566) and online beginning
the afternoon of February 23, 2016. R. 590-591. Mr. Verity verified the accuracy of each of the
factual statements made in USA Today’s online (R. 1428-1430 at 232:12-241:18) and print
stories. R. 1430-1431 at 241:20-244:6. Mr. Verity never made a demand for retraction upon USA
Today or Mr. Reilly. R. 1431 at 244:10-12. Mr. Reilly testified during his deposition that he did
not intend to cause the Veritys any type of harm in writing his story, he specifically sought
Mr. Verity’s review and comment on his story before publishing and “believe[s] the reporting is
completely fair and accurate.” R. 215 at 66:3-4; 1170:3-19. See also R. 1155 at 88:5-8 (“My
guidance throughout this process is accuracy and fairness and public importance”). A conclusion
affirmed by Defendants’ experts. R. 1317-1339 (Roger Plothow) and 1340-1364 (Mark Lodato).
On the same day, KGW reposted the USA Today online story on its webpage.
R. 471-472. Mr. Verity verified the accuracy of the information reported in the KGW story, but
he took issue with the fact that “more information” could have been included in some instances.
R. 1437-1439 at 268:16-274:16. Mr. Verity never made a demand for retraction upon KGW.
R. 1439 at 274:18-20.
13.

KTVB Airs Story After Mr. Verity’s Resignation.

On the evening of February 22, 2016 – after Mr. Verity had resigned – KTVB broadcast a
story by Ms. Tremblay entitled “7 Investigates: Gap in Tracking Teachers.” Supp. R. at DKK
Dec. Ex. 69. See generally R. 232-241 at 91:17-126:2. On March 4, 2016, KTVB posted a
written version of this story on its website. R. 538-540. Mr. Verity verified the accuracy of the
KTVB online story. R. 1433-1435 at 253:22-259:6. Mr. Verity never made a demand for
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retraction upon KTVB. R. 1435 at 259:6; 242 at 161:14-17.
Later, Ms. Tremblay found a minor error in her story—the statement that Mr. Verity was
not included in the NASDTEC database when in fact he was—and immediately updated her
online story. R. 542-547. 2 Ms. Tremblay testified that she did not intend to imply falsehoods
about Mr. Verity and, specifically, did not intend to “send the message to [her] readers that
Verity slipped through the cracks because Idaho didn’t know about his history.” R. 238 at
114:18-23. Defendants’ experts confirmed that Ms. Tremblay’s reporting complied with
journalistic guidelines. R. 1317-1339 (Roger Plothow) and 1340-1364 (Mark Lodato).
14.

Mr. Reilly’s Story is 2017 Pulitzer Finalist for Investigative Reporting.

In 2017, Mr. Reilly and USA Today were finalists for the 2017 Pulitzer Prize in
Investigative Reporting for their February 15, 2016 story “Broken Discipline Tracking Systems
Let Teachers Flee Troubled Pasts.” R. 605.
C.

Course of Proceedings.
On March 28, 2016, the Veritys initiated this matter by filing a Complaint that pled three

counts against Defendants: (1) defamation; (2) invasion of privacy – false light; and (3) negligent
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. R. 15-29. Subsequently, the Veritys filed a First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”) to correct certain Defendants’ designations. R. 70-84. The FAC
restated the three causes of action for defamation, invasion of privacy and emotional distress
against USA Today, KTVB and KGW, and Stephen Reilly and Tami Tremblay in their
individual capacities. Id.
2

This minor error did not figure in to the lower court’s decision on summary judgment. See
R. 1532-1535.
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After significant discovery, on June 26, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment as to all claims. R. 114-788. The Veritys opposed the Motion (R. 789-1171), and
Defendants filed an objection and motion to strike some of the material filed in opposition by the
Veritys (R. 1256-1270) and a reply brief. R. 1271-1286. See also R. 1365-1475; 1481-1487
(Defendants’ supplemental declarations).
On July 14, 2017, the Veritys filed a Motion for Leave to Amend to Add a Claim for
Punitive Damages. R. 1171-1255. Defendants opposed the Motion, including submitting expert
testimony as to the journalistic quality of reporting done by each of the Defendants.
R. 1301-1364. On October 6, 2017, the district court denied the Veritys’ Motion for Leave to
Amend. R. 1517-1520.
On October 18, 2017, the district court entered an Order Granting in Part and Denying in
Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 1521-1541. After noting that “both parties
agree that this case involves media defendants making statements on a matter of public concern”
(R. 1523), the district court held “[t]his means Mr. Verity must prove either that Defendants’
statements were false or that Defendants’ statements – though literally true – could create false
inferences. In addition, Mr. Verity must prove that Defendants were negligent in publishing a
false statement.”

R. 1523 (emphasis in original).

The district court then re-characterized

Mr. Verity’s defamation claim as “more accurately characterized as a claim of defamation by
implication.”

R. 1529.

In so doing, the district court specifically rejected Defendants’

contention that the cause of action for defamation by implication does not exist in Idaho. R. 1529
at n.4. The district court also rejected Defendants’ argument that summary judgment was
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appropriate because “the statements are literally true and that, in any event, the allegedly
defamatory statements are protected assertions of opinion,” holding, instead, that “the literal
truth of a statement will not defeat a defamation by implication claim” (R. 1532) and “an opinion
may be actionable if the audience cannot determine for itself whether an author’s or
broadcaster’s specified sources of information support the opinion.” R. 1532.
The district court held that Mr. Verity was not a public official or public figure and,
therefore, need not prove actual malice to prevail on his defamation by implication claim.
R. 1532. “He must prove only that Defendants were negligent regarding the falsity of the
implications they conveyed.” R. 1532. Applying this standard, the district court held “a jury
could find that each defendant implied, and intended to imply one or all of the following: that
Mr. Verity was a danger to female students, that Mr. Verity deceived Idaho officials by hiding
his past conduct, and that Mr. Verity engaged in criminal conduct by having sex with a minor.”
R. 1533. The district court was not concerned about the lack of evidence in the record to support
any intent by Defendants to imply anything beyond the true facts reported, explaining:
“[e]vidence of a defendant’s intent to create a defamatory implication does not have to come in
the form of extrinsic conduct. The particular manner or language of the communication can
supply the necessary evidence.

Here, the omission of facts may supply such evidence,

depending upon how the factfinder ultimately views the statements and omissions.” R. 1533 at
n.6. Accordingly, the district court denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on
Mr. Verity’s defamation claim. “Defendants’ statements may be literally true; however, that fact
alone does not entitle Defendants to summary judgment.” R. 1535. The district court also noted
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that “issues of material fact prevent the Court from applying Idaho Code §§ 6-713 and § 6-710
(‘fair report privilege’) as a matter of law” to Mr. Verity’s defamation by implication claim.
R. 1535 at n. 8.
With respect to Mr. Verity’s false light claim, the district court reformulated the cause of
action to include “implied falsities” to explain that Mr. Verity had the burden to demonstrate that
“the defendant was negligent in determining the truth of the information or whether a false
impression would be created by its publication.” R. 1535 (emphasis added). Then, the district
court held that genuine issues of material fact existed on all elements of Mr. Verity’s false light
claim. R. 1536.
On the intentional infliction and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, the
district court summarily concluded that Mr. Verity has presented “some evidence” on all of their
elements to create a genuine issue of material fact. R. 1537-1538. Finally, the district court
refused to dismiss Defendants Stephen Reilly and Tami Tremblay in their individual capacities.
R. 5139.
On October 31, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal Pursuant to
I.A.R. 12 with the District Court. R. 11. On November 17, 2017, the district court entered an
Order Approving, in Part, Motion for Permissive Appeal. R. 13. On November 21, 2017,
Defendants filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal Pursuant to I.A.R. 12 with this Court. On
December 20, 2017, this Court entered an Order Granting Motion for Permission to Appeal.
R. 13-14. On December 22, 2017, Defendants timely filed their Notice of Appeal with the
district court. R. 1614.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Appellants’ statement of the issues on appeal is as follows:
(1)

Whether, as a public school teacher and coach, Mr. Verity is a public official,

requiring him to prove actual malice by each of the Defendants in this case.
(2)

Whether Idaho recognizes the tort of defamation by implication.

(3)

If Idaho does recognize the tort of defamation by implication, what the elements

of the claim are.
(4)

If Idaho does recognize the tort of defamation by implication, what the standard

of proof for that claim is.
(5)

Whether Appellants are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys’ fees on

appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because a permissive appeal under I.A.R. 12 from a denial of a motion for summary
judgment leads to an unusual procedural posture, this Court must “rule narrowly and address
only the precise question that was framed by the motion and answered by the trial court.”
Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789, 215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009) (quoting Winn v.
Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 501, 777 P.2d 722, 723 (1989)); Pioneer Irr. Dist. v. City of Caldwell,
153 Idaho 593, 596-97, 288 P.3d 810, 813-14 (2011). However, this Court has provided
additional guidance to lower courts on issues outside of the scope of the permissive appeal when
those issues are relevant to those directly on appeal. Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 621, 338
P.3d 1220, 1225 (2014). Indeed, the purpose of a permissive appeal is to “advance the orderly
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resolution of the litigation.” Winn, 116 Idaho at 501, 777 P.2d at 723.
When reviewing the district court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court
applies the same standard used by the district court. Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,
556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Regan v. Owen, 413 P.3d 759, 762 (Idaho 2018). “If there is no genuine issue of material fact,
only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.” Indian Springs
LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., 147 Idaho 737, 746, 215 P.3d 457, 466 (2009) (quoting Cristo
Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007)).
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

As a Public School Teacher and Coach With Access to Children in Vulnerable
Situations, Mr. Verity Should be Considered a Public Official, Requiring Him to
Prove That Each Appellant Acted With Actual Malice.
This Court should hold that Mr. Verity is a public official in this case for the purposes of

First Amendment analysis. Idaho’s public has a profound interest in a robust and open debate
regarding the performance and behavior of its schoolteachers and coaches—government
employees who are paid with public funds and placed in positions of trust and responsibility with
children at school and away from school after hours.
Public officials, since 1964, have been required to prove the defendant’s actual malice—
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth—before they may recover damages. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 Sup. Ct. 710, 725-26 (1964). The United
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States Supreme Court has declined to create a bright line rule regarding which government
employees are public officials under the First Amendment. Id. at 283, n. 23, 84 Sup. Ct. at 727.
The Court has provided guidance, however, holding that public officials are of at least two kinds.
First, public official status definitely applies to government employees who have “substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.” Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 85, 86 Sup. Ct. 669, 676 (1966). These include, for example, elected officials and
others that directly create policy. See id. Second, public official status applies to those positions
that have “such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the
qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in
the qualifications and performance of all government employees . . . .” Id. at 86, 86 Sup. Ct. at
676.
The United States Supreme Court has so far declined to hear the issue of whether public
school teachers and coaches are public officials. However, in a dissent from denial of certiorari
on that issue, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, reasoned that teachers are
public officials because they work in highly important roles: “[T]he status of a public school
teacher as a ‘public official’ for purposes of applying the New York Times rule follows a fortiori
from the reasoning of the Court in Rosenblatt . . . . [P]ublic school teachers may be regarded as
performing a task that goes to the heart of representative government.” Lorain Journal Co. v.
Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 958, 106 Sup. Ct. 322, 326 (1985) (Brennan, J.) (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
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With the guidance of Rosenblatt, and later Brennan’s dissent in Milkovich, state courts
have held that teachers are public officials. See, e.g., Basarich v. Rodeghero, 321 N.E.2d 739,
742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (public school teachers and coaches are public officials because they are
public employees who “maintain highly responsible positions in the community,” because public
schools “are consistent subjects of intense public interest and substantial publicity,” and because
the conduct and policies of teachers and coaches “are of as much concern to the community as
are other ‘public officials’ and ‘public figures.’”); Elstrom v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 270,
533 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (teachers are public officials because “Minnesota
strongly emphasizes education,” “teachers act with the authority of the government,” “[t]eachers
who abuse their positions may affect many lives,” and society holds teachers in a “position of
special trust”); Kelley v. Bonney, 606 A.2d 693, 710 (Conn. 1992) (“Unquestionably, members
of society are profoundly interested in the qualifications and performance of the teachers who are
responsible for educating and caring for the children in their classrooms.”); Sewell v. Brookbank,
581 P.2d 267, 270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (“As far as the law of defamation is concerned, teachers
are ‘public officials.’”); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 343 A.2d 251, 258 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975), cert.
denied 426 U.S. 907, 96 Sup. Ct. 2228 (1976).
Holding public school teachers to the higher constitutional standard of public officials is
even more critical where those teachers are also coaches—public employees who have
significant access to, and control over, student-athletes in vulnerable positions and often times
away from school and after-hours. For example, in Johnston v. Corinthian TV Corp., 583 P.2d
1101, 1103 (Okla. 1978), the Oklahoma Supreme Court, applying the reasoning of Rosenblatt,
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held that a middle school teacher and coach was a public official. The case arose when a TV
station accurately reported that Johnson, a middle school teacher and coach, required a student to
strip and submit to a whipping by him and team members before rejoining the wrestling team.
The court relied on Rosenblatt to hold that Johnston was a public official, noting, “we can think
of no higher community involvement touching more families and carrying more public interest
than the public school system.” Id.
The facts of the instant case highlight the important rationale for treating public school
teachers and coaches as public officials – particularly since the alleged defamatory implications
(based on true facts) are matters of public concern. Mr. Verity, as a teacher and coach, had
unchecked access to Rachael and other female students-athletes – he saw Rachael during the day
in his classroom as his teacher’s aide, had access to her on nights and weekends and away from
home as her coach and, knowing of her vulnerability as a young woman who was not living with
her parents, had unlimited phone and text access to Rachael at all hours. This sort of access to,
and influence over, students requires the utmost responsibility, care and trust by teachers and
coaches. Mr. Verity admits he abused this access and influence by engaging in an inappropriate
relationship involving sexual contact with his student-athlete, Rachael. Once Mr. Verity was
teaching and coaching in Idaho, he again breached the public trust and his students’ welfare by,
for example, tickling, slapping girls on the butt, and making inappropriate comments to them.
R. 417-419. Here, the Appellants played an important role in alerting the public to Mr. Verity’s
misconduct—particularly since Mr. Verity had concealed his behavior from local school officials
in Idaho. R. 413; 1412 at 166:21-167:11; 436-37; 444-51; 1422 at 208:23-209:18.
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The facts of this case overwhelmingly support a holding that Mr. Verity is a public
official for the purposes of the First Amendment. The Court need not make a bright line rule that
teachers and coaches are always public officials. However, at least under the egregious factual
circumstances of this case, the Court should hold that Mr. Verity is a public official. As such,
Mr. Verity is required to demonstrate, with clear and convincing evidence, that each Appellant
acted with actual malice in making each of the allegedly defamatory statements at issue. See
Elliott v. Murdock, 161 Idaho 281, 385 P.3d 459, 465 (2016) citing New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 Sup. Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (a public figure plaintiff may
only recover “if he can prove actual malice, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth, by clear and convincing evidence”). Because there is no evidence to support such a
contention (see R. 1301-1364), this Court should hold that all of Mr. Verity’s claims are barred.
B.

Idaho has Long Held That True Statements are Absolutely Privileged, and Not
Actionable in Any Form.
The First Amendment reflects the “profound national commitment to the principle that

debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . .” New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 Sup. Ct. 710, 721 (1964). To protect this healthy debate, “[t]ruth
may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is
concerned.” Garrison v. State of La., 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 Sup. Ct. 209, 216 (1964).
The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized this fundamental constitutional principle
that true or substantially true statements cannot support a claim for defamation: “It is axiomatic
that truth is a complete defense to a civil action for libel.” Baker v. Burlington, 99 Idaho 688,
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690, 587 P.2d 829, 831 (1978) (emphasis added) (citing Hemingway v. Fritz, 96 Idaho 364,
529 P.2d 264 (1974)). “If a statement is proven to be true, it is non-defamatory.” Steele v.
Spokesman Review, 138 Idaho 249, 251–52, 61 P.3d 606, 608–09 (2002). Literal truth, however,
is not required: “[S]o long as the substance, the gist, the sting of the allegedly libelous charge be
justified,” minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity. Baker, 99 Idaho at 690, 587 P.2d at 831.
This rule of absolute privilege for true statements is particularly important in the context of
matters of public concern: “[W]here allegedly defamatory speech is of public concern, the First
Amendment requires that the plaintiff, whether public official, public figure, or private
individual, prove the statements at issue to be false.” Steele, 138 Idaho at 252, 61 P.3d at 609
(quoting Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776, 106 Sup. Ct. 1558 (1986)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
This “axiom”—that true statements are absolutely privileged—is equally applicable to
the torts of false light and emotional distress. Steele, supra, 138 Idaho at 253, 61 P.3d at 610
(citing Hoskins v. Howard, 132 Idaho 311, 316, 971 P.2d 1135, 1140 (1998)) (in order to state a
claim for false light against a media defendant, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there is “some
‘public disclosure of falsity or fiction concerning the plaintiff.’ Where the publication is free
from material falsehood, recovery under this cause of action may not be had.”) 3; Snyder v.
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 443–44, 131 Sup. Ct. 1207, 1211 (2011) (citing Hustler Magazine Inc. v.
3

See also Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961) (false light
requires “publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye”). Put another way,
when a false light claim “rests upon the same acts as the libel and slander claims, it is subject to
the same immunities and defenses as the libel and slander.” Holbrook v. Chase, 12 Media L.
Rep. 1732 (Idaho 4th Dist. 1985).
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Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51, 108 Sup. Ct. 876, 879 (1988) (“The Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.”).
It is undisputed that everything Appellants published about Mr. Verity is true and/or
substantially true and on matters of public concern. Such statements lie at the heart of protected
speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 9 of the Idaho
Constitution. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-759,
105 Sup. Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985) (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776, 98 Sup. Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978)) (“[S]peech on
‘matters of public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection’”); In re
Contempt of Wright, 108 Idaho 418, 423, 700 P.2d 40, 45 (1985) (“Art. I, § 9 of the Idaho
Constitution provides for protection of freedoms substantially similar to those of the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution”). Thus, this Court should simply follow its longstanding
and uninterrupted line of cases holding that truthful statements of fact are not actionable however
labeled. Such a holding would prohibit Mr. Verity’s case in its entirety, would affirm the
principle of stare decisis, would provide certainty to all media and members of the public and
would ensure that debate on matters of public concern remains “uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.” New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270, 84 Sup. Ct. at 721.
C.

This Court Should Not Recognize a Claim for Defamation by Implication, and
Thereby Deviate From its Longstanding Precedent Holding That True Statements
Are Not Actionable.
Idaho has never abandoned the principle that true statements on matters of public concern
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are absolutely privileged. Nonetheless, the district court, relying on Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho
566, 790 P.2d 347 (1990), held that Mr. Verity’s claim based on the publication of true facts of
public concern could go forward under the tort of defamation by implication. R. 1529. Wiemer
did not abandon Idaho’s long line of cases holding that truth is an absolute defense to
defamation, nor did it adopt an entirely new (and constitutionally suspect) tort of defamation by
implication.
In Wiemer, the plaintiff, the husband of a woman who shot herself, challenged the truth
of the statement that a reporter (Rankin) published challenging the wife’s suicide, claiming the
evidence was “overwhelming” that the wife did not shoot herself. Wiemer, 117 Idaho at 571,
790 P.2d at 352. Much was made of what “inferences” could be reached from the article, but
ultimately the case turned on the truth of statements actually made in the article. This Court,
recognizing that the publication was a matter of public concern, held that it was the plaintiff’s
burden to prove falsity regarding the reporter’s statement that “the evidence was overwhelming”
that the wife had not shot herself. Id. at 573, 790 P.2d at 354. And, “[l]iberally construing these
facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in Wiemer’s favor . . . we conclude that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of Rankin’s statement that the evidence was
overwhelming.” Id.
Thus, far from adopting a new tort in Idaho, Wiemer affirmed the basic principles of
defamation law—that a false statement of fact must underlie a valid claim for defamation. In the
27 years of case law since Wiemer, the only Idaho court to specifically address a defamation by
implication claim “assumed” that such tort existed in Idaho before dismissing it. Worrell-Payne

28

v. Gannett Co. Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1176 (D. Idaho 2000), aff'd, 49 F. App'x 105 (9th Cir.
2002) (“Assuming the tort of defamation by implication exists in Idaho, the First Amendment
poses at least two obstacles to this claim”) (emphasis added).
A defamation by implication claim is one that is alleged when the plaintiff complains not
about “what is literally stated, but from what is implied.” White v. Fraternal Order of Police,
909 F.2d 512, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Such claims are constitutionally perilous, as the plaintiff can
manufacture a defamatory message from “words not reasonably capable of sustaining such
meaning.” Id. at 519. The district court in White posed a hypothetical that exemplifies the
problem: “If a newspaper accurately reported that an individual was arrested and charged with a
crime, a reader could reasonably infer, i.e., guess, surmise or derive as a probability, that the
individual actually committed the crime,” even if the reporter intended to only communicate the
facts of the arrest and charging. White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 707 F. Supp. 579, 589, n. 12
(D.D.C. 1989), aff’d, 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Defamation by implication claims are
particularly problematic “where the reported facts are materially true and the alleged defamation
is not stated explicitly.” White, 909 F.2d at 519. Such claims are obviously contrary to the
principle—explained above—that true statements are not actionable.
Holding publishers responsible for any defamatory inferences that a reader or viewer
could draw from materially true facts is therefore profoundly at odds with the First Amendment.
“A publisher reporting on matters of general or public interest cannot be charged with the
intolerable burden of guessing what inferences a jury might draw from an article and ruling out
all possible false and defamatory innuendoes that could be drawn from the article.” Woods v.
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Evansville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480, 487-88 (7th Cir. 1986). Such a “burden” is not only
intolerable, but impossible since there is no way to guarantee or control what any reader may
infer, speculate, or conclude on the basis of facts of which he is made aware. Plainly, “[a]
publisher cannot be responsible for every strained interpretation that a plaintiff might attribute to
its words.” Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 477 A.2d 1005, 1011 (Conn. 1984) (citing
Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 553–56 (9th Cir. 1983); Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc.,
510 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.N.J. 1981)). Thus, such claims inhibit the robust discussion of public
affairs—the First Amendment’s promise of open discussion on matters of public concern and
regarding public officials is inhibited when a defamation claim “depends fundamentally on an
interpretation of various aspects of the broadcast, not on anything directly said in it.” Pierce v.
Capital Cities Commc’n, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 500 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861,
99 Sup. Ct. 181 (1978).
Given the constitutional concerns, some courts—including nearby Washington—have
created a bright line rule that a plaintiff cannot state a claim for defamation by implication based
on the publication of true facts. E.g., Sisley v. Seattle Pub. Sch., 321 P.3d 276, 279 (Wash. App.
2014) (“A defamation claim may not be based on the negative implication of true statements.”);
Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1432 (8th Cir. 1989) (“We do not recognize
defamation by implication.”); Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 477 A.2d 1005, 1012
(Conn. 1984) (“The media would be unduly burdened if, in addition to reporting facts about
public officers and public affairs correctly, it had to be vigilant for any possibly defamatory
implication arising from the report of those true facts.”); Mihalik v. Duprey, 417 N.E.2d 1238,
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1240-41 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (“It would be incongruous [under the Times’ malice standard] to
permit a public official to recover where statements . . . were true as far as they went. . . . We
think that their falsity . . . has not been established merely because in the aggregate they have an
insinuating overtone.”); Diesen v. Hessberg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 452 (Minn. 1990) (“[W]e hold an
allegedly false implication arising out of true statements is generally not actionable in
defamation by a public official. . . .”); Schaefer v. Lynch, 406 So.2d 185, 186 (La. 1981) (“Even
though a false implication may be drawn by the public, there is no redress for its servant.”).
Further, some courts recognize a defamation by implication claim, but only when the stated facts
are false. Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 1983). This Court has not addressed
this issue, but should follow this line of cases to reject such constitutionally-suspect claims.
Compounding the constitutional infirmity of the district court’s ruling is the fact that it
recognized a cause of action for defamation by implication by omission—a claim never raised by
Mr. Verity nor recognized by this Court. R. 1533. Merely omitting facts favorable to Mr. Verity
or facts that Mr. Verity (or the district court) thinks should have been included does not make a
publication false and subject to defamation liability. This is particularly the case where the
alleged omitted facts would not have “negated” the amorphous bad impression that Mr. Verity
alleges. See, e.g., R. 1324-1326. For example, the Fifth Circuit rejected a defamation plaintiff's
claim that a news report was misleading because the broadcaster did not include all the
potentially relevant information about the plaintiff. Green v. CBS Inc., 286 F.3d 281 (5th Cir.
2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 887 (2002). The Green court held that since “CBS accurately
reported the facts, albeit not all of the facts, whether or not the story painted [the plaintiff] in an
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attractive light is irrelevant.” Id. at 285. The court held that even though including more facts
would have led to a more balanced report, the broadcast did not create a false impression and
thus was not defamatory. Id.; see also Peter Scalamandre & Sons, Inc. v. Kaufman, 113 F.3d
556, 563 (5th Cir. 1997) (omission of footage that would have portrayed subject in a more
favorable light insufficient to establish actionable falsity because it “is common knowledge
television programs . . . shoot more footage than necessary and edit the tape they collect down to
a brief piece.”); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1985) (rejecting claim to
hold magazine liable “for omission of those additional facts that [the plaintiff] believes should
have been published, but whose omission did not make what was unpublished untrue”), aff’d on
reh’g, 788 F.2d 1300 (1986); UTV of San Antonio, Inc. v. Ardmore, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 609, 613
(Tex. App. 2002) (no defamatory false impression where television report omitted facts
favorable to plaintiff).
Moreover, the basic principle of editorial autonomy recognized in Miami Herald Publ’g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 Sup. Ct. 2831 (1974), is at odds with the theory of libel by
implication by omission. See NBC Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), Inc. v. Living Will Ctr., 879 P.2d 6,
15 (Colo. 1994); Newton v. NBC, Inc., 930 F.2d 662, 686 (9th Cir. 1991). As the United States
Supreme Court has aptly stated: “The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the
decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public
issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control
and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process
can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have
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evolved to this time.” Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258, 94 Sup. Ct. at 2840.
And, recognizing a defamation by implication tort under these circumstances, where the
publications are largely based on public records, would effectively overrule the statutory fair
reporting privilege. Idaho Code §§ 6-713, § 6-710(3). “In the State of Idaho, ‘fair and true’
reports of ‘public official proceedings’ are privileged. I.C. § 6-713(4).’” Worrell-Payne, supra,
134 F. Supp. 2d at 1178 (citing Wiemer, supra, 117 Idaho at 573, 790 P.2d at 357). If the Court
sustained a defamation by implication claim here, plaintiffs could state a cause of action based
on implications arising from a fair and true report of public proceedings.
Due to these numerous constitutional concerns and the uncertainty that a contrary ruling
would create for all publishers of truthful information on matters of public concern, Appellants
urge this Court to follow the lead of neighboring states like Washington and decline to recognize
a cause of action for defamation by implication.
D.

If the Tort of Defamation by Implication Exists in Idaho, its Elements and Standard
of Proof Must be Consistent With Heightened Constitutional Standards. Mr. Verity
Cannot Meet This Heightened Standard.
This Court should not adopt the tort of defamation by implication for all the reasons

stated above. However, if it is inclined to do so, the Court must only allow such a claim after a
plaintiff makes an “especially rigorous showing,” due to the constitutional problems these claims
present. Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, 993 F.2d 1087, 1092-93 (4th Cir. 1993). “[C]laims of
defamation by implication, which by nature present ambiguous evidence with respect to falsity,
face a severe constitutional hurdle.” Locricchio v. Evening News Ass’n, 476 N.W.2d 112, 129
(Mich. 1991) (emphasis added). In order to protect free expression, those courts accepting such a
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claim require that a plaintiff clear two distinct and demanding hurdles: first, the plaintiff must
show that “the disputed [publications] are reasonably capable of sustaining the false implications
[the plaintiff] attributes to them.” Worrell-Payne, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (citing Dodds v.
American Broadcasting Co., 145 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 1998)). This threshold determination
is comprised of two parts, as explained below. And, significantly, the plaintiff “must present
clear and convincing evidence from which a jury could find that the [media] actually intended to
convey the false impressions.” Id. at 1176-77 (emphasis added). The district court’s holding that
Mr. Verity need only demonstrate that “Defendants were negligent regarding the falsity of the
implications they conveyed” is, therefore, wrong as a matter of law.

R. 1532. Finally,

defamation by implication claims must rest on false implications of fact, not opinions or ideas.
E.g., Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1066.
In the instant case, had the lower court properly applied these standards, Mr. Verity’s
entire case should have been dismissed. Instead, the lower court found that the publications
implied three actionable defamatory implications: (1) implication that Mr. Verity was a danger
to female students; (2) implication that Mr. Verity deceived Idaho officials by hiding his past
conduct; and (3) implication that Mr. Verity committed a crime by having sex with a minor.
R. 1532-1535. 4
1.

Mr. Verity Must Show, as a Threshold Matter, That the Publications are
Reasonably Capable of Sustaining the Alleged Defamatory Implications.

The initial threshold determination is comprised of two parts—the plaintiff must show
4

Appellants maintain that even if the publications can sustain these alleged defamatory
implications, they are true or substantially true or are nonactionable opinions.
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that the publication is “reasonably capable of a defamatory interpretation,” and that the
defamatory interpretation is endorsed by the defendant within the publication’s four corners. See,
e.g., White, 909 F.2d at 520. In other words, “the court must first examine what defamatory
inferences might reasonably be drawn from a materially true communication, and then evaluate
whether the author or broadcaster has done something beyond the mere reporting of true facts to
suggest that the author or broadcaster intends or endorses the inference.” Id.; accord Chapin v.
Knight-Ridder, 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993); Wyoming Corp. Servs. v. CNBC, LLC,
32 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1189 (D. Wyo. 2014) (“The language must not only be reasonably read to
impart the false innuendo, but it must also affirmatively suggest that the author intends or
endorses the inference.”); Kavanagh v. Zwilling, 578 F. App’x 24, 24-25 (2d Cir. 2014) (“To
survive a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation by implication . . . the plaintiff must make a
rigorous showing that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both
to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or
endorsed that inference.”)
The first part of the threshold determination—whether the language can be reasonably
read to impart the false innuendo—depends not necessarily on what a reasonable reader could
infer, but rather on the meaning reasonably conveyed. See White, 707 F. Supp. at 589; Webb. v.
Virginian-Pilot, 752 S.E.2d 808, 812 (Va. 2014). And, whether an alleged defamatory
implication can reasonably be drawn from a materially true communication is a question of law
for the court. Webb, 752 S.E.2d at 812. (“Resolving it is an essential threshold, gatekeeping
function of the court before a case is submitted to the jury.”)

35

Here, none of the Appellants’ publications are reasonably capable of sustaining the
defamatory implications that the lower court found.
a.

The publications are not reasonably capable of sustaining the
implication that Mr. Verity committed a crime by having sex with a
minor, and nothing on the face of the publications endorses this view.

In the Order Approving, in Part, Motion for Permissive Appeal, the district court
“clarified” that the only Appellant potentially liable for defamation by implication for implying
that Mr. Verity committed a crime by having sex with a minor is KGW. R. 1580. In so doing,
the district court noted that the KGW broadcast was “literally true, however, that fact alone does
not entitle [Appellants] to summary judgment. True facts can create false implications.” R.
1535. The only “evidence” identified in the Order to support the contention that KGW intended
to imply that Mr. Verity committed a crime by having sex with a minor is that “KGW aired
statements that Mr. Verity had a ‘sexual relationship with a student,’ and that he was disciplined
for it . . . . In the context of the KGW broadcast a jury could conclude the student was a minor
and that the sexual relationship involved sexual intercourse.” R. 1534. Mr. Verity does not
dispute that it is true that he had “an inappropriate physical relationship involving sexual
contact” with a high school student. R. 254-57.
Nothing in the KGW broadcast indicates that it intended to communicate any message
other than the true facts reported. And, even if the KGW broadcast can reasonably sustain the
false implication that Mr. Verity committed a crime by having sex with a minor, there is no
evidence from the face of the broadcast itself that KGW affirmatively endorsed this view. KGW
did not go “beyond the mere reporting of true facts to suggest that the author or broadcaster
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intends or endorses the inference,” as required by White. The district court did not point to any
evidence from the broadcast suggesting an endorsement of the defamatory implication nor did
Mr. Verity in his opposition to Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Without evidence in
the broadcast that KGW intended or endorsed this interpretation, Mr. Verity simply cannot clear
the threshold determination on this implication.
b.

Mr. Verity likewise cannot meet the threshold determination
regarding the allegedly defamatory implication that he deceived Idaho
officials by hiding his past conduct.

The publications cannot reasonably sustain the implication that Mr. Verity deceived
Idaho officials by hiding his past conduct. The only support that the district court found for
Appellants’ intent to convey the “implication that Mr. Verity deceived Idaho Officials by hiding
his past conduct” is its conclusion that “Idaho officials arguably knew about Mr. Verity’s past in
Oregon. However, none of [Appellants’] publications acknowledged this fact.” R. 1533. This is
not only untrue, it is pure speculation not based on any evidence before the district court.
The USA Today publications describe the process that Mr. Verity went through to obtain
his Idaho teaching credential, negating any implication that Verity deceived Idaho state officials
by hiding his past conduct. R. 465-66; 468-69. KTVB, in its online story and broadcast,
interviewed the spokesperson for the Idaho Department of Education, who indicated all
applicants are screened: “Regardless if the person is in state or out of state the process is
relatively the same,” and applicants “would need to go through a background check and submit a
fingerprint card which would be run through state and federal databases.” R. 538-40; 542-47;
Supp. R. at DKK Dec. Ex. 69. The KGW broadcast focused on certification standards in Oregon
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and had a similar interview with a state licensing official. Supp. R. at DKK Dec. Ex. 69. The
context of these statements in the KTVB and KGW broadcasts indicated that Mr. Verity went
through the state screening process to obtain a license in Idaho.
The district court’s support for KGW’s intended implication is that “[t]he KGW
broadcast shifted directly from a psychiatrist’s recommendation that Mr. Verity not be left alone
with female students to Mr. Verity obtaining employment as a teacher in Idaho. Individuals
considering these statements could reasonably infer that Mr. Verity hid his past from at least
some Idaho officials.” R. 1534. This single juxtaposition of true facts (on matters of public
concern) by a single Appellant in a single publication cannot be the basis for sustaining a claim
against all Appellants for the alleged implication. Mr. Verity did not meet his burden on
summary judgment to show that the publications are reasonably capable of sustaining this
allegedly false implication. Therefore, Mr. Verity cannot clear the threshold determination on
this implication.
c.

Mr. Verity likewise cannot meet the threshold determination
regarding the allegedly defamatory implication that he is a danger to
female students.

The sum total of the evidence that the district court identified in support of the alleged
implication that Mr. Verity is a “danger” to female students is: (1) the observation that the
Appellants published the true fact that Oregon revoked Mr. Verity’s teaching license while also
publishing the true fact that a psychologist concluded that Mr. Verity should not be left alone
with female students over the age of twelve (12); and (2) the fact that each Appellant was aware
of another psychologist’s conclusion that Mr. Verity was not a danger to any student yet did not
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publish that fact. R. 1533. The district court stated that “[a] jury could conclude that these
statements implied that Mr. Verity was dangerous to female students,” and “[t]he [Appellants’]
omission of [the favorable psychological finding by Dr. Miller] could lead a jury to conclude that
[Appellants] were at least negligent in implying that Verity was a danger to female students.”
Id. 5 This is not the standard. Mr. Verity must show clear and convincing evidence that the
Appellants endorsed a defamatory implication. One factual juxtaposition of true statements and
one omission of a minor positive fact cannot be clear and convincing evidence of intent to
defame.
Furthermore, Mr. Reilly’s USA Today online and print article dated February 24, 2016
does mention Dr. Miller’s finding in addition to other facts favorable to Mr. Verity. R. 465-66;
468-69. The article states that “In its order granting Verity’s license, the Idaho Department of
Education’s Professional Standards Commission cited a psychologist’s opinion that he had been
rehabilitated through therapy and ‘was contrite, embarrassed and humble about his misconduct.’
The Idaho order notes Verity ‘continued to coach youth sports since leaving his Oregon teaching
position with no known recurrences of problems.’” Id. (emphasis added). The district court’s
Order ignores the plain language of this article, further evidence that the district court merely
considered the publications in the aggregate. At the very least, summary judgment on this
5

The district court held that Appellants defamed Mr. Verity by omission. R. 1533. However,
“omission of relatively minor details in an otherwise basically accurate account is not actionable.
This is largely a matter of editorial judgment in which the courts, and juries, have no proper
function.” Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 383, 366 N.E.2d 1299,
1308 (1977). See also McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003) (an
omission to state or publish a fact does not constitute the requisite “publication” requirement for
a slander of title claim).

39

implication should be granted to USA Today and Reilly because they did publish Dr. Miller’s
positive finding and published the fact that there were no known additional incidences at the time
of Mr. Verity’s licensure. Without evidence in each of the publications that the Appellants
endorsed this implication, Mr. Verity cannot clear the threshold determination on this
implication.
2.

Mr. Verity Must Show That the Appellants Actually Intended to Defame
Him.

If Mr. Verity can clear the threshold determination outlined above by looking at the face
of each of the publications, he must then show that the Appellants subjectively, i.e., actually,
intended to defame him. This means that Mr. Verity must show that each Appellant knew of the
defamatory implication and intended to communicate it. Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1063; Nichols v.
Moore, 477 F.3d 396, 402 (6th Cir. 2007); Saenz v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1318
(9th Cir. 1988). The standard of actual intent is mandated by the First Amendment, which
requires that the defendant publish a “calculated falsehood.” Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74. And,
Ninth Circuit precedent requires “clear and convincing evidence from which a jury could find
that the [media] actually intended to convey the false impressions.” Worrell-Payne, 134 F. Supp.
2d at 1176-77 (citing Dodds).
This standard—of requiring actual intent—is strenuous, but “strikes the proper balance
between protecting victims of defamation and protecting against the possible chilling effect that
results from overly broad applications of our defamation laws.” Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1064 (citing
Newton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 930 F.2d 662, 681 (9th Cir. 1990)). Nevertheless, if some false
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and defamatory implications go unaddressed due to such a holding, “[t]he First Amendment
requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.” Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341, 94 Sup. Ct. 2997, 3007 (1974). Indeed, public debate must be
protected to ensure freedom of expression has the “breathing space” that it needs to survive.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271–72, 84 Sup. Ct. at 721 (1964) (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 Sup. Ct., 328, 338 (1963)).
Here, the district court cited to no evidence of actual, subjective intent on the part of the
Appellants to defame Mr. Verity. R. 1602-05. Rather, the district court looked to the face of the
documents to determine subjective intent. Id. This is erroneous, and conflates the threshold
requirement of determining whether the publication itself shows an intent to defame (objective
intent), as described above, with actual intent to defame. Mr. Verity cited no evidence—let alone
clear and convincing evidence—that could lead a jury to conclude that Appellants intended to
communicate a false implication. R. 789-1171. He cited to no affidavit, deposition or admission
on this point. Id. In fact, the only record evidence supports that the journalists involved did not
intend to harm Mr. Verity. R. 215 at 66:3-4; 1170 at 146:3-19; 238 at 114:18-23; see also R.
1155 at 88:5-8. Mr. Verity simply did not sustain his burden on actual intent on summary
judgment, and without any evidence of actual intent to impliedly defame him, his defamation by
implication claim fails.
3.

Defamation by Implication Claims Cannot be Based on Implied Opinions,
Ideas, Feelings or Other Vague Impressions.

Publications under consideration must state or imply provable facts that are demonstrably
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false.

Schmalenberg v. Tacoma News, Inc., 943 P.2d 350, 357 (Wash. App. 1997);

Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1, 110 Sup. Ct. 2695. A defamation by implication action must therefore
falsely imply facts, not ideas or opinions. E.g., Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1066 (ABC segment that
plaintiff allegedly implied that he “is one of the three worst judges in the country” not actionable
because it was “in the nature of an opinion rather than the type of factual assertion that can be
proved to be demonstrably false.”); Worrell-Payne, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1177-78 (Implied opinion
that the plaintiff “ought” to have done something, implied opinion comparing plaintiff to two
other housing officials who resigned under pressure, and implied opinion that plaintiff was unfit
to serve as housing official were not actionable.) Further, implied facts must be more than just an
“implied disparaging message”—it is not enough to show an overall negative message
independent of the facts. Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes,” 67 F.3d 816, 822 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
Price v. Stossel, 620 F.3d 992, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Price also contends that even if the
broadcast did not imply accusations of criminal behavior, it nonetheless implied accusations that
Price was dishonest. The district court found that the remaining implications alleged by Price
were too vague to constitute actionable defamation. We agree.”); Mihalik, 417 N.E.2d at 1241
(The alleged defamatory implications were “too vague and uncertain, and too fragile in impact,
to be the basis of a libel action by a public official, particularly when each [statement] viewed
alone is consistent with the truth.”) Plainly, the rule that a plaintiff cannot recover for implied
opinions or ideas is simply an extension of the rule—long recognized in Idaho—that pure
opinion is not actionable. E.g., Elliott v. Murdock, 161 Idaho 281, 385 P.3d 459, 465 (2016)
(citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40, 94 Sup. Ct. 2997, 3007 (1974));
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Worrell-Payne, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (“A statement of opinion based on fully disclosed facts
can be punished only if the stated facts are themselves false and demeaning.”) An implied
opinion is “evaluated as any other opinion is evaluated.” Worrell-Payne, 134 F. Supp. 2d at
1178.
Many of Mr. Verity’s alleged implications are the sorts of opinions, ideas and negative
impressions that simply are not actionable. In particular, Mr. Verity states that the publications
falsely imply that he was dangerous, and the district court agreed that this was somehow
actionable. (R. 1603.) Putting aside the observation that this implication is likely true, it is a
nonactionable opinion or idea, derived from disclosed and admittedly true facts. Like the judge
in Dodds who complained that ABC insinuated that he was one of the “three worst” in America,
or the plaintiff in Price who complained that the broadcast implied he was “dishonest,”
Mr. Verity cannot recover on the basis that the Appellants implied he was “dangerous,” or for
any other negative impressions derived from disclosed, true facts. As Idaho has long recognized
(and recently reaffirmed in Elliott, 161 Idaho at 287, 385 P.3d at 466), such opinions are not
actionable. See also Idaho State Bar v. Topp, 129 Idaho 414, 416, 925 P.2d 1113, 1114 (1996)
(citing Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho at 572, 790 P.2d at 353) (in determining whether a
statement is one of fact or opinion, “the important consideration . . . is not whether the particular
statement fits into one category or another, but whether the particular article provided sufficient
information upon which the reader could make an independent judgment for himself.”). This is
especially true here, where the opinion is “implied” from admittedly disclosed, true facts
regarding a matter of public concern. Thus, this Court should hold that Mr. Verity cannot state a
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defamation by implication claim based on implied opinions and reverse the district court’s
holding on this point.
E.

Appellants are Entitled to an Award of Their Reasonable Attorney’s Fees and Costs
on Appeal Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 Because Respondent’s Claims Were
Brought Without Basis in Law or Fact.
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides that “the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to

the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” See also I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). This
Court has ruled that Idaho Code § 12-121 may also serve as a basis to award attorney fees on
appeal. Fuquay v. Low, 162 Idaho 373, 397 P.3d 1132, 1138 (2017). An award of fees under
Section 12-121 is warranted when the Court is left with the “‘abiding belief” that the appeal was
brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Am. Semiconductor, Inc. v.
Sage Silicon Sols., LLC, 162 Idaho 119, 395 P.3d 338, 346 (2017), reh’g denied (June 8, 2017);
see also Balderson v. Balderson, 127 Idaho 48, 54, 896 P.2d 956, 962 (1995).
Here, Appellants have been forced to incur significant fees and costs in defending their
admittedly true publications on matters of public concern. Because such speech has always been
at the heart of First Amendment protections, Mr. Verity’s claims are without basis in law or fact,
and Appellants are entitled to an award of their fees under Idaho Code § 12-121.
V.

CONCLUSION

Absolute protection for truthful statements on matters of public concern lies at the heart
of free speech protections under the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. This bright line provides
certainty for publishers of all kinds. Mr. Verity seeks to abrogate this longstanding constitutional
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principle by allowing his claims - based on admittedly true, disclosed facts of public concern to go forward under a variety of civil tort theories. This Court should not allow him to make an
end-run around these constitutional protections.
Accordingly, Appellants respectfully request that this Court hold that, under the facts of
this case, Mr. Verity is a public official and that Mr. Verity's claims are barred in their entirety
because he cannot demonstrate that each of the Appellants acted with actual malice in publishing
each of their news stories. Appellants further request that this Court hold that Appellants' true
and/or substantially true statements of fact on matters of public concern are absolutely privileged
from civil liability, regardless of the label given to the claim and, accordingly, reverse the district
court's conclusion that Idaho recognizes a claim for defamation by implication.
DATED this 25 th day of April, 2018.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

~lit--J
Kersti H. Kennedy
Attorneys for Appellants
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